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Summary  findings
In parallel (dual) foreign-exchange markets - extremely  macroeconomic gains (in terms of keeping equilibrium in
common  in developing  countries  - a market-determined  the balance  of payments  and lower inflation)  were
excharge rate coexists  with one or more pegged  greater  than the costs  in terms of misallocation  of
exchange  rates.  resources.
Kiguel  and O'Connell report the main lessons  from a  In Ghana  and Tanzania,  the dual exchange  rate system
World Bank  research  project  on how these  systems  work,  was prolonged  to maintain  overvalued  real exchange
based  mainly  on case  studies  in Argentina,  Ghana,  rates and expansionary  macroeconomic  polities.  The
Mexico,  Sudan, Tanzania,  Turkey,  Venezuela,  and  large premium  in those countries (at times more than
Zambia.  1,000 percent)  shows  the dramatic  inconsistency
On the whole,  the experiences  were disappointing.  between  exchange  rate policy  and monetary  and fiscal
Most countries  tolerated  high premiums  for long  policies.
periods,  which harmed the allocation  of resources  and  On determinants  of the parallel  exchange  rate, the
growth. The studies  indicate  no clear gains  from  evidence  indicates  that macroeconomic  fundaments  (such
prolonging  a dual system.  as fiscal  deficit,  credit policies,  and so on) matter most.
The case for a dual foreign  exchange  system  is stronger  In the short run the premium  is driven by expectatiokis
when the system is adopted as a temporary option to  about the evolution of these macroeconomic factors.
deal with a severe balance of payments crisis. Argentina,  Overall, in the countries examined in the project, the
Mexico, and Venezuela resorted  to a dual system at the  existence of a parallel foreign exchange market generated
time of the debt crisis, to smooth  our the devaluation in  fiscal losses. These losses resulted because the public
the exchange rate to achieve the needed real  sector was a net seller of foreign exchange at the official
depreciation. This helped to maintain limited control  exchange rate. This means that unification has some
over domestic inflation, and avoided a sharp drop  in real  pleasant fiscal arithmetic.
wages while protecting the balance of payments. In the  The experience with unification indicates that it
longer term, not much was gained.  usually takes place at the parallel exchange rate. Most
In the cases studied, the dual system was misused more  countries unified to a crawling peg system, though some
often than not: it was used too long and the premium  opted for floating exchange rates. Successful unification
was higher than it should have been. Venezuela, for  to a fixed exchange rate was less frequent, and it
example, used the system for six years with an average  required strong adjustment in fiscal and monetary
120 percent premium, Mexico for five years (average 30  policies. Regarding speed, unification was quick in
percent), and Argentina for eight years (average 44  countries where the parallel system was used
percent).  In Argentina  and Venezuela,  the dual system  temporarily,  and gradual in those where the system
was used to avoid macroeconomic adjustment while  existed for long periods and with a tradition of
protecting international reserves. It is doubtful the  widespread foreign exchange controls.
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Appendix1.  Introduction
Paralel foreign  exchange markets-which are extremely  common in developing  countries- are
those in which a market-determined  exchange rate coexists with one or more pegged exchange rates.
Although there is an extensive theoretical  literature on the macroeconomic  implications  of parallel
foreign exchange markets,  evidence  on how these systems work in practice is limited.'  This paper
reports the main lessons from a Worid  Bank research  project aimed at filling this gap. 2
The core of the project is a set of case studies of parallel foreign cxchange  rate market
episodes in Argentina,  Ghana, Mexico, Sudan,  Tanzania,  Turkey, Venezuela,  and Zambia. These
countries span a wide range of development  levels, degrees  of sophistication  of financial  markets,  apd
degrees of legality of parallel markets. The case studies are supplemented  by a pair of cross-country
studies of parallel market experience  in developed and developing  countries. Taken together, the
papers in the project provide an important  body of evidence  on the macroeconomic  characteristics  of
parallel foreign exchange  systems.
There is great variety in experiences  with multiple  exchange  rate systems (as discussed  in
section 2). Some countries adopted a parallel foreign  exchange market on a temporary  basis to deal
with balance  of payments of crisis (mainly in Latin America) while in others the parallel  market is
more permanent  and developed  in response  to widespread  foreign  exchange controls (especially  in
Africa).  There are also differences  regarding  the spread (as shown in table 1). Based on data for 38
countries we find that there is wide dispersion  in the size of average the premium for the period 1970-
90, ranging from low levels (less than 10%) in most Asian countries  and in the few industrialized
countries that adopted the system, to very large (exceeding  50%) in many African and Latin
lizondo (1990) provides a stwvey of the theoreticai literature.
2 The study is "The macroeconomic implication  of multiple exchange rate systems,' RPO 675-30.TASLE  I
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Turkey  8.9  9.1  8.4  52.8
c4klma  9.0  4.4  12.7  28.3
=isral  9.7  26.5  5.8  70.0
MtdIg  3.2  2.4  3.7
MODERATE  PREMIUM
BelMa  10.1  5.5  17.8  293.1
-guad  12.1  8.0  34.2  96.1
India  13.8  17.4  13.1  93.7
Kenya  15.3  16.8  152  44.9
Chle  15.6  8.3  18.5  1260.0
Pak; a  23.0  26.9  14.8  211.9
&,va  25.6  11.1  43.1  173.0
Syria  27.1  5.7  213.4  1046.5
Domin. Rppublle  29.0  26.5  36.0  213.0
Sri Lanka  38.6  73.8  15.2  237.4
Argenua  43.3  55.8  43.3  363.0
Mawi  45.0  51.7  41.4  108.0
Aedian  21.3  18.2  24.6
LARGE  PREMIUM
Pen  50.2  51.2  27.0  278.9
N  i  59.2  37.8  85.5  458.6
Zaire  625  106.0  13.6  295.1
0hoia  65.5  41.1  103.9  226
Zambia  66.7  1025  40.8  361.9
Sudan  64.6  85.4  78.8  344.4
Egypt  84.6  60.0  100.1  248.4
Ghan  120.9  66.3  142.0  4263.7
Tanzania  127.2  95.5  214.3  301.4
Algei  189.6  59.5  332.5  418.6
ledIan  80.4  73.5  100.02
American  countries. It is also clear that the premium increased  in the 1980s  relative to the 1970s,  as
countries  intensified  foreign  exchange controls  to deal with larger macroeconomic  imbalances  and
more severe balance  of payments  problems. Finally, even countries  that have low or moderate
premiums  had at one time or another episodes of high premium. This indicates  that it is not unusual
to use the parallel  exchange rate as a safety valve at times of balance  of payments  crisis. Nevertheless,
there are a few episodes (e.g. Ghana 1980-86,  Tanzania times, Chile 70-73, etc.) when extremely  high
premiums were maintained  for long periods (over three years).
The paper concentrates  on three issues: (i) the reasons for the adoption  or emergence  of
parallel foreign exchange  markets, (ii) the functioning  of parallel foreign  exchange market;  especially
the two way relationship  betwecn the impact  of macroeconomic  policies on the parallel premium, and
the impact of changes in the premium  on macroeconomic  p-rformance, and (iii) issues related to the
unification  of foreign  exchange markets.
We examine adoption  in section 3, where we identify two distinct pattems: in one, countries
start with unified foreign exchange  markets and then a parallel  market is created in response  to a
balance  of payments  crisis. The episodes  of Argentina  in 1981  and again in 1982,  Mexico in 1(W82
and Venezuela  in 1983 fit this pattem. The objective in these cases is to rely on the parallel foreign
exchange  market to avoid the undesired  effects of the overshooting  of a unified exchange rate on
domestic prices, while maintaining  limited control  over international  reserves. In the second case, the
parallel foreign  exchange market develops  gradually in response  to widespread  restrictions  to operate
in the official market  Most African  countries  without  convertible  currencies  display this pattem.  The
premium generally  rises in these economies  as controls are tightened  at times when countries have
balance of payments problems. In countries  with protracted  extemal imbalances,  large premiums  can
last for a long time (as was the case in Algeria, Ghana, etc.).
In section 4 we discuss  the functioning  of parallel foreign  exchange  markets. We first examine
the determinants  of the parallel exchange rate and the premium. The analytical  framework  is a model3
where the premium is jointly determined  by asset market conditions  and the parallel  current account
(th  stock flow-model). The results, based on the case studies, broadly support the stock-flow  model.
The premium increases  as a result of a real appreciation,  a rise in real money balances or in the budget
deficit, or of a reduction  in the uncovered  differential  between domestic and foreign interest rates.  We
then examine the impact  f a parael  foreign  exchange market on macroeconomic  variables. The
evidence from the case studies indicates  that unless the adoption  of parallel foreign  markets is
accompanied  by severe foreign  exchange  controls  they fail to insulate international  reserves from
capital flows. In most of the countries in our sample, parallel foreign  exchange markets inflicted  fiscal
losses, in some cases as large as IC percent of GDP. In addition, the case studies show that paralle
foreign  exchange markets are not an effecdve instrument  to maintain low inflation  in the longer term.
We look at unification  in section 5, and find that there is great  diversity  on the speed, and the
exchange rate system adopted. Experience  shows that unification  often takes place rapidly at dmes of
macroeconomic  crisis, as multiple  exchange rates cease to be useful in protecting  internadonal
reserves. This was certainly  the case in Argentina  (in 1989)  and in Venezuela.  There are also cases of
successful  gradual unification,  especially in African  countries where it usually  moved in tandem with
price deregulation  and trade liberalization. Ghana and Tanzania  followed  this approach  quite
successfully.
The key for successful unification  is to choose an exchange rate regime that is consistent  with
the underlying  fiscal and monetary  policies. Countries that maintain  money financed budget  deficits
cannot succeed in unifying  into a fixed  exchange rate, as inflation  would quickly lead to an overvalued
real exchange rate. Whether  countries unify to a flexible  exchange rate system, or a crawling peg is of
secondary  importance.
In section 6, we provide evidence  indicating  that parallel foreign  exchange markets do provide
limited insulation on the balance  of payments  and on domestic  prices in the short term, but are
ineffective  in the longer term. Section 7 provides estimates  of the fiscal effects of exchange rate4
unification  for a subset of the case study countries, and shows that in most cases it resulted in fiscal
losses (as large as 10 percent of GDP). We conclude in section 8 with some policy lessons from the
project.
2.  Varieties  of Parallel  Market
At the heart of any parallel foreign  exchange  marcet is a set of government  restrictions
assigning cerlain  transactions  to the pegged or managed  exchange rate and others (perhaps  implicitly)
to the parallel sate. The details of exchange restrictions  vary widely from country  to country. For
most macroeconomic  purposes,  however, the array of parllel  systems  observed in developing
countries  can be reduced  to a simple  classification  according  to the coverage and legality  of the
parallel rate (Table 2).
The most fundamental  distinction  is with respect  to coverage. Virtually  all systems assign
capital outflows,  and usually inflows as well, to the parallel rate. Where systems differ is in the
assignment  of current transactions. We therefore  distinguish  in Table 2 between  systems in which the
free rate applies mainly to the capital account and those in which it also applies to a broad range of
current transactions. We omit the case in which exchange controls  apply solely to current transactions,
since this case is not observed in practice.
A secondary  distinction  is with respect to the legality of transactions  at the parallel rate.  At
the formal level, such transactions  are either legal or iUegal. Given the high costs of enforcement,
however,  governments  typically tolerate a substantial  amount of illegal parallel market activity. It is
not unusual to observe attempts  to suppress  parallel markets,  but success in such efforts -- and the
commitment  to continue them--is typically  short-lived. We therefore distinguish  between systems  in
which transactions  at the parallel rate are either legal or illegal but largely tolerated and those in which
a substantial  threat of enforcement  is present most of the time.Tat% 2  Clbseuiom  of Cme Study Episodes.97-1990
Coverae  of Parsllel  Rate
Mainly Capital  Capital Account and
Account  Some Current Account
Eutope (*)  Venezuela  ('83-'89)
LAgKl/  Mexico  ('82-'88)  Tanzania (after 1984)
Tolrated  Argentina  ('81 '89)  Ghana ('83-'87)
Turkey ('80-'84)  Zambia ('87-'88)




Rate  Ghana (before '83)
Sudan
Illgal  Tanzania (to '84)
Turkey (1970,s)
Zambia (except '87-'88)
*  Includes  dual exchange  rab  experiences in Belgium  (1957-90),  France (1971-74)  and Italy (1973-
74).5
Table 2 emphasizes  that macroeconomically  important  parallel markets  do not emerge in the
absence  of exchange restricdons  on transactions  for investment  and portfolio purposes. Given the ease
with which foreign exchange  acquired through the capital account can be converted into trade finance,
exchange  controls  on current transactions  would be virtually unenforceable  in the absence of
convertibility  restrictions  on the capital account. And while direct taxes and quandtative  restrictions
on trade helF detemine the level of the premium in a parallel system, both theory and the available
evidence--from  Indonesia,  Uruguay,  and the CFA countries  in Africa. all with  open capital accounts--
suggest that in the absence of capital controls  the parallel market remains  thin and the premium small
even in the presence of substantial  tariffs,  quantitative  restrictions  and illegal trade.
In practice, coverage and legality  are matters of degree rather than discrcte categories. This
leads to two difficulties  in the claassification  of case study episodes. First, parallel systems can and do
evolve over time, moving  gradually from one category  tc another  as the degree of coverage  and/or
legality changes. Second, and more importantly,  the categories  are broad enough that
macroeconomically  important  sub-episodes--such  as the crackdown  on illegal activity  in Tanzania in
1983--may  not show up as a qualitative  shift in the table.  With these caveats in mind, Table 2 gives a
rough classification  of parallel market episodes in the case study countries  over the period from 1970
to  1990.
Beginning  with the upper left quadrant,  the European  experiences  with dual exchange rates
involved legal parallel rates applying  mainly to the capital account. Argentina  (1981-89)  and Mexico
(1982-b8)  represent  extended episodes  of narrow coverage and effective legality; in the case of
Argentina,  the parallel rate was initially a legal dual rate (1981 and 1982)  but became  an illegal (but
tolerated) rate on re-imposition  of exchange  controls. Venezuela  (1983-1989)  represents  a legal dual
system buttressed  by severe f,Vieign  exchange rationing  for imports. Auction-based  parallel markets in
Ghana (1986-87)  and Zambia  (1987-88)  also involved  a legal free rate that applied to a broad range of
current transactions. The black-market  systems that operated in the 1970s  in Ghana, Sudan, Tanzania,6
Turkey and Zambia were accompanied  by extensive foreign  exchange radoning  on the current account;
the table shows the transitions  experienced  by some of these countries  as they implemented
macroeconomic  reforms and rroved towards  convertibility  on the current account (and for Turkey, on
the capital account as well).
3.  Adoption or Emergence of Parallel Foreign Exchange Markets
There  are essentially  two ways in which parallel foreign  exchange markets  develop and
become important  in the economy (i.e. the premium  and volume of transactions  become large). In the
first, the authorities  split the foreign  exchange  market in order to phase in a devaluation  when capital
outflows prompt a balance  of payments crisis. In the second, the parallel market emerges  gradually in
response  to efforts to maintain an overvalued  exchange rate.  In the latter case, the authorities  are
forced to restrict access to the official foreign  exchange market for both capital and current account
transactions;  eventually,  controls are tightened  and the illegal market begins to acquire macroeconomic
importance. In what follows we use the case studies to illustrate these two distinctive  patterns.
3.1  Dual Parallel  Markets to Stem Capital Outflows
Dual exchange rate systems  were generally  adopted on a transitional  basis at times of balance
of payments  crisis to limit the inflationary  impact  of devaluations. The main objective  in these
episodes was to phase in the required  devaluation  when problems  of macroeconomic  management  were
compounded  by capital outflows. The theoretical  advantages  of dual rates in such a situation are
straightforward. Relative  to a unified peg, a dual system insulates  international  reserves from capital
outflows,  since these lead to a depreciation  of the parallel rate rather than to a loss of reserves.
Relative to a unified float, a dual system helps to limit the impact of capital outflows on domestic
prices, since current account transactions  are effected at the official (pegged  or managed)  exchange
rate.7
Mexico's dual system, for example,  was adopted  in August 1982 as part of a policy response
to the debt crisis. The system was viewed as a temporary  measure to smooth out the possibly adverse
effects of the much needed devaluation  on domestic  prices. Venezuela's system of February 1983 was
also adopted  on a temporary  basis to deal with collapsing  oil revenues  and massive  capital flight
during the debt crisis.  The use of dual rates in Venezuela  was modeled in part on a successful
previous experience: in 1960,  the government  had instituted  a dual system as a way of phasing in an
official devaluation  of 35 percent over a period  of three years. The aim in 1983 was similar, as the
government  envisioned a three-year  transition  to a unified fixed-rate  system, with a cumulative
devaluation  of 39.5 percent.
In Argentina,  legal dual exchange rate systems were adopted as a response  to balance of
payments  crises several times in the eighties. For example,  a dual exchange rate system was adopted
in June 1981 when Argentina  faced a large fiscal deficit, accelerating  inflation,  an overvalued
exchange  rate, large capital outflows, and extensive private sector indebtedness. A similar situation
led to the re-adoption  of a dual exchange rate system in July 1982,  after a brief attempt  at unification.
In addition to these episodes, Argentina  had a semi-legal  parallel exchange rate system through most
of the eighties, since periods of full convertibility  (and a truly unified  exchange rate) were few.
In most cases the adoption  of the system was prompted  mainly by fears that the nominal
depreciation  required to restore  external  balance in the short run would result in an unacceptable  and
potentially  permnanent  burst of inflation. 3 A unified exchange rate would likely have to overshoot its
equilibrium  level, producing  a dramatic fall in real wages and facing the authorities  with a difficult
choice between accommodating  increased wage demands  and forcing a severe recession. 4 In Mexico
and Argentina,  such concems led the authorities  to use the commercial  rate as a nominal anchor whose
'  In Brazil,  for example, the devaluations of the  mid- and late seventies were associated with a permanent  increase in inflation
(see Kiguel and Liviatan (1988).
4  Overshooting is a common feature of floating  exchange rates.  It is associated with the maxi-devaluation  option  as  well,
since the real depreciation required to stem private capital outflows  in the presence of generalized uncertainty regarding
macroeconomic  events may well be larger than the real depreciation consistent with restoration of macroeconomic balance in the
medium term.8
fluctuations  were to be minimized  or at least smoothed  out over time.  In Venezuela,  the dual regime
was instituted  in an election year and was designed in part to protect the prices of wage goods. Figure
I shows the Mexican financial  real exchange rate overshooting  its medium run level upon adoption  of
the dual regime in august of 1982; when the authorities  devalued the commercial  rate three months
hater,  the magnitude  of the devaluation  was significantly  below the initial movement  in the financial
rate.
Official parallel systems have also been used for brief periods by three of the four African
countries in our set of case studies. Ghana and Zambia both had short-lived  foreign exchange  auctions
applying to a substantial  share of external  transactions  in the 1980s. In Sudan, where a pegged  dual
rate had been used to attract worker remittances  and other transactions  since the early 1970s,  the
illegal parallel market was legalized for a brief period starting in mid-1983. In contrast to Mexico  and
Venezuela,  the dual exchange rate systems in Ghana and Sudan were instituted  as part of broader
atLempts  to move towards a unified,  market-determined  official exchange rate and reduce the
importance  of the illegal parallel market. In both cases, the dual regime allowed for efficiency  gains
in the allocation of foreign  exchange while continuing  to protect, temporarily,  the real incomes  of
groups subsidized  by the overvalued  official rate. The importance  of the latter objective  is illustrated
dramatically  by Zambia's 1987  short-lived  dual system, which was quickly abandoned  when the
resulting  increases in the prices of wage goods led to riots in the Lusaka Copper belt.Figure l
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3.2  Unofficial  Parallel Markets to Maintain  Overvalued  Exchange Rates
Unofficial (black)  parallel foreign  exchange markets  exist as a matter of course in most
developing  countries,  in response  to ongoing restrictions  on capital account transactions  in the official
foreign  exchange market. As with official dual systems,  these markets become important  at times of
balance  of payments  crisis.  But in contrast  to the official  case, where adoption is often temporary  and
part of an overall policy adjustment,  a growing black market typically reflects a systematic  bias against
devaluation. Exchange  controls are extended to cover not only the capital account but also a broad set
of current account transactions. These controls are then gradually  tightened  in an attempt to resolve
fundamental  inconsistencies  between  the exchange rate and the pressure of expansionary
macroeconomic  policies.
The typical pattem is one where the economy  faces a gradual worsening  in the balance of
payments  as a result of expansive  monetary and fiscal policies that raise inflation  and lead to
overvaluation  of the official exchange rate.  As the government  fails to correct this imbalance  through
a tightening  of macroeconomic  policies or devaluations  of the official rate, it is forced to increase
restrictions  on the private sector's access to foreign  exchange at the official  exchange rate.
Expectations  of a possible maxi-devaluation  of the official rate, or of a further tightening  of foreign
exchange controls,  add to the excess demand for foreign  exchange in the short run by encouraging
inventory  accumulation  by importers  and portfolio  substitution  away from domestic  assets towards
foreign exchange. These forces support  the demand for foreign  exchange in an illegal market. The
supply is provided  by exporters  of goods, tourists, and domestic workers  abroad, all of whom may find
it profitable  to divert foreign exchange  from the official to the illegal market.
Each of our case studies of illegal parallel markets presents a period in which the above
sequence  of events is to some extent applicable. The black market for foreign  exchange in Turkey,
which had emerged in the early 1940s,  expanded significantly  in the 1970s,  in a period characterized
by mounting  macroeconomic  imbalances  and an overvalued  official exchange rate. In Sudan, the10
1970s  were characterized  by expansive  macroeconomic  policies aimed at supporting  ambitious
economic  development  programs. These policies, together with exogenous  shocks like the oil price
increase of the mid 1970s,  resulted  in inflation and an appreciating  real exchange rate. Since the
authorities  responded  primarily  by implementing  widespread  controls on foreign  trade and payments,
the black market for foreign exchange  expanded  to serve a growing volume  of illegal transactions  on
both the current and capital accounts. Ghana also experienced  a significant  growth in illegal foreign
exchange transactions  in the 1970s,  the result of a reluctance  to devalue in spite of rising inflation,
balance  of payments  problems  and an overvalued  exchange  rate. The pressure of excess demand for
official foreign  exchange in Ghana is evidenced  by the size of the parallel  premium on foreign
exchange, which increased gradually from 50% in 1974 to more than 2000% in 1982. The emergence
of a large premium  in the parallel market followed  a similar pattem in Tanzania and Zarnbia;  Figures
2a-2c show the Tanzanian  case.  Figure 2a shows intemational  reserves falling to low levels following
the collapse of the coffee boom and the import liberalization  of 1978;  the authorities  responded  by
tightening  exchange controls rather than devaluing,  with the result of a rising parallel premium. The
rising premium and increasing real overvaluation  exacerbated  the secular  decline in official exports, as
shown in Figure 2b; Figure 2c shows the resulting fall in officially financed  imports as the exchange
control regime was tightened  further and further.
Why was a tightening  of foreign  exchange controls  preferred  over across-the-board
devaluations  of the official rate, or contractionary  macroeconomic  policy as way to deal with balance
of payments  problems? In Tanzania,  an aversion  to devaluation  was established  in the late 1960s,
rooted in arguments  about low supply elasticities  in traditional  export agriculture  and high dependence
of the economy on imported intermediate  and capital goods. These arguments  gave way by the early
1980s  to concems about the adverse  effects of a maxi-devaluation  on income distribution. In Ghana,
the maxi-devaluation  of 1971 was followed  immediately  by a military  coup. The association  of these
two events, whether causal or not, exercised a strong influence  against  devaluations  throughout  the10-A
Figure  2.a
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1970s. In Zambia,  exchange rate policy evolved beginning  in the early 1970s  as a shifting  bargain
between the Govemment,  extemal creditors,  and an urban constituency  subsidized  by overvalued
exchange rates. Political pressures  made overvaluation  increasingly  hard to avoid as urbanization
proceeded and copper prices--and  with them, real incomes--declined  starting in the mid 1970s.
4.  Empirical Findings
4.1  Determinants  of the Premium: Theory
A fundamental  lesson of the theoretical  literature on parallel exchange  rates -- reviewed  in
Agenor (1990a,1992)  and Lizondo (1990)--is  that the parallel premium is jointly determined  by asset
market conditions and the parallel current account. Portfolio  decisions  and expectations  play a central
role in the short run; most models predict, for examnple,  that the parallel  exchange rate will depreciate
and the premium increase in anticipation  of a devaluation  of the official rate or an increase in the
money  supply. Likewise, the premium  will rise if there is an unexpected  expansion  in the money
supply. In the longer run, current account influences  dominate;  a tightening  of restrictions  on imports
at the commercial  rate, for example,  raises the premium in the long run as imports are "diverted"  to
the parallel foreign exchange  market.
Most of the case study authors adopted  an analytical  framework  based on the standard
stock/flow  model from the flexible exchange  rate literature. 5 We therefore  use this model to introduce
the basic issues regarding  determination  of the parallel  premium. The model is depicted  in Figure 3
[cf. Dombusch  and Kuenzler  (1993)];  details are in the appendix.
In the short run, the parallel exchange  rate is detemmined  by portfolio  equilibrium. The
demand for dollars is the downward-sloping  function DD.  Since capital account transactions  take
place at the parallel exchange rate, a key determinant  of the domestic  currency return on foreign  assets
is the expected  rate of depreciation  in the parallel market. Letting U be the parallel rate, this expected
E  The paper  by Koun (1976) was adapted  to the dued  markets  case by Flood (1978), Marion  (1981)  and  Lizondo  (1987), and
to the  black  markets  case  by Dornbusch,  et al (1983),  Macedo  (1987),  Karnin  (1988)  and Pinto  (1991).12
rate of depreciation  is given by (U,,1/U) .. I =  (Ej,l/E,)(Z.lj/Z) - 1, where E and Z are the official
exchange rate and the parallel premium.6 Given the current premium,  therefore, the demand for
dollars increases  (shifting  DD to the right) with increases  in either the expected rate of official
depreciation  or the expected future premium,  since these raise the yield differential  in favor of dollars.
By the same logic, the DD curve shifts to the left with a rise in the interest rate on domestic assets. A
rise in the dollar value of domestic assets shifts DD to the right as wealth holders seek to re-balance
their pornfolios.
The existing stock of net foreign  assets ("dollars")  held privately is F.  Portfolio  equilibrium
prevails when this stock is willingly  held; this occurs at point 0, where DD and F intersect. The
premium is therefore  an increasing  function  in the short run of the expected  future premium,  the real
stock of domestic financial  assets, and the official interest parity differential,  since these all increase
the portfolio  demand for dollars; it is a decreasing  function  of net foreign  assets.
A second set of influences  on the parallel  premium comes from the parallel trade balance,
shown on the left in Figure 3.  While the details differ, the underlying  mechanism  is independent  of
the legality  of transactions  at the parallel rate. The flow supply of dollars (S) comes from legally
assigned exports, export smuggling  and underinvoicing,  and import overinvoicing;  the flow demand
(D) comes from legally  assigned imports  and import smuggling. A rise in the premium stimulates  the
flow supply and discourages  the flow demand,  resulting  in an increased  parallel current account. The
requirement  that the parallel  current account eventually  be balanced  therefore  implies a long-run
relationship  between the premium and other determinants  of the parallel current account. 7 A real
appreciation,  for example,  worsens the parallel current account by reducing  aggregate  exports (which
in tum reduces  export smuggling,  given the parallel premium)  and increasing  the incentive  for import
smuggling  into the domestic market; this drives up the premium  in the long run.  A rise in import
Z *  U/E is one  plus  the parallel  premiunm  Variables  dated  t+l are expected  values.
Including  the stock  of formign  assets,  if interest  income  goes  through  the  parallel  market.13
tariffs (or a fall in export taxes) worsens the parallel current account by encouraging  smuggling  and
underinvoicing  of imports; thus the parallel premium  rises.
Adjustment  to the long run is govemed by the evolution  of asset stocks and expectations  of
depreciation  over time.  Since net capital flows at the pegged official rate are typically  prohibited
(through export surrender requirements  and rationing  of foreign exchange  for imports),  the primary
source of changes in the stock of foreign  assets is the parallel trade balance.  This implies that the
'flow' or 'trade balance' determinants  that matter in the long run can also influence  the premium in
the shon run.  Similarly,  domestic asset stocks change  primarily  through monetary financing  of the
fiscal deficit; this gives fiscal variables  a potential  role in both the short and long run. Figure 3 shows
adjustment  over time to an increase in the domestic money stock measured  in dollars, under the
assumption  that the official  exchange rate remains fixed. Starting  at point 0, the monetary  expansion
shifts the DD curve to the right and increases  the premium to Z, in the short run; the premium
subsequently  falls as the parallel current account surplus leads to an increase in private holdings of
foreign  exchange. Under static expectations  regarding  the parallel rate, adjustment  occurs along DD,
from point I to point 2.  Under rationil e,i*ectations,  market participants  foresee the appreciation  that
occurs in the parallel market  -,  nng the adjustment  L'  .h; this reduces  the demand for dollars, implying
a smaller initial increase in the premium, and adjustment  to poinm  2 takes place along a downward-
sloping path below DD. 9
The model has strong predictions rega...ing  the signs of the coefficients  in regressions  for the
premium. An jrmrease  in .al  domestic  money,  or in the interest parity differential  in favor of foreign
assets, for example,  raises the premium  in  ae short run. This effect may persist in the long run if the
parallel current account includ.!s  interest income on foreign  assets; otherwise,  the Dortfolio
An exception  is when  the  uthorities  intervene  at the 'free' rate,  as in Mexico.
We  assume  in Figure  3 chat  interest incomnc  channeled  through  the  parallel  market  is negligible;  in this  ase,  the rronetazy
expansion  has  no long-run  effect  on the  premTium.  If interest  incore is important,  the accumulation  of formign  assets  would shift S
to the  right over time,  and  the  premniurr  /ould  fall in the  long run.13-A
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detenninants have no long-run influence  on the premium. A real appreciation  of the official exchange
rate or a tightening  of import restrictions raises the premium in both the short run and the long run.
The nominal  exchange rate affects the premium  only indirectly,  through real money balances  or the
real exchange rate; nominal devaluations  therefore  have no effect on the premium if they are fully
offset by money growth and domestic inflation.
If the parallel current account is modeled in more detail and the real exchange ratc is
endogenized,  variables  like aid inflows and the termns  of trade enter the equation,  often with
theoretically  ambiguous  signs. In a black market system, for example,  a terms of trade improvement
can lower the premium throiigh  an induced  liberalization  of official import allocations  and an increased
supply of export smuggling  dollars; it can raise the premium,  however, if the income effect is
sufficiently  strong to appreciate the real exchange  rate for imports and lead to an increased  demand for
import smuggling.' 0 The domestic money stock can also be endogenized  via a government  finance
condition,  leading to an important  role for the fiscal deficit.
4.2  Determinants  of the Premium:  Results
An empirical specification  for the stock/flow  model is derived in the Appendix. Versions  of
this equation were estimated for Argentina,  Ghana, Sudan, Tanzania,  Zambia,  and Turkey."  As
indicated  in Table 3, the case studies differed with respect  to the frequency  of the data, the details of
the estimation technique,  and the degree to which variables like real money balances and the real
exchange rate were endogenized.
Table 4 summarizes  the empirical results, which largely conform  to the predictions  of the
stock/flow  model. The table identifies  short and long-run effects where possible, indicating  with +
'o It mnay  also lower expectations of official devaluation, but this effect is already being controlled for since the uncovered
official interest parity differential, which is included in the equation, reflects the rat  of expected official depreciation. Note also
that the terms of trade can enter the model directly through the paallel current account (as a component of x',)
"  Similar specifications are derived and estimated by Azam and Besley (1989), Ag6nor (1990b), Chhibber and Shafik (1991),
Dornbusch,  et al (1983), Kamin (1992), Kaufmann  and O'Connell (1991), Khamas  and Pinto (1989), Phylatkis (1992), and others.14-A
Table 3 Versions of the Parallel Premium Equation
Argentina: monthly  and quarterly  cointegration  equatioas  for the parallel rate, using  a partial equilibrium
stocklflow  model.
Mexico:  quurterly structural VAR for  the parallel premium and  five other macro variables (the
comme cial exchange  rate, the price level, the money  stock, the interest rate, and output).
Venezuela: descriptive  analysis guided  by a stock/flow  modek  modified  to incorporto import restrictions.
Ghana:  annual equation for the parlel  premium, using the flow equilibrium conditioa for the illegal
current and capit  accounts.
The Sudan:  quarterly cointegration  and error-correction  equations for the parallel premium. based on a
stock/flow model with expectations  of official devaluation  andogenized.
Tanzania:  annual dynamic equations for the paallel  premium. using a partial equilibrium stock/flow
model  with the real exchange  rte  endogoenized.
Zambia: annual modified error-correction  equation for the paailel  premium. using a stock/flow model
with the real exchange  rate and expectations  of official  devaluation  endogenized.
Turkey: monthly  dynamic  equations  for the paralol premium,  using a partial equilibrium  stock/flow  model
adjustmented  for domestic  currency accounts.
Belgium:  monthly exploratory dynamic equations for the  parallel premium using stock and  flow
determinants.
Soureas:  Case study  papers.14-B
Table 4  Determinants of the ParaUel Premium
ARG  GHA  MEX'  SUD  TAN  TUR  ZAM
PORTFOUO DETERMINANTS
Real Money  Balances  Short  +  +  +-  +  +-  +4s
(MIE)  Long  +  +-  +-
Official Interest Rate  Short  +  +-  +-
Parity Deviation  Long  +  +  +  a
TRADE BALANCE  DETERMINANTS
Official Real Exchange  Short  +  +  +
Rate
Long  +  +-  +  +  - +
Aid  Short
Long
Terms of Trade  Short
Long  -,4+  - -'
Export Tax Trade  Short  - +
Long
Import Tariff Rate  Short  +,-+
Long
Real Output  Short  --
Long  - - +
Notes
* refers to an estimated effect that is significaot  at the 10% level or better.  For details, see Ansu (1991), Table
1; Aron and Elbadawi  (1993), Equation  (3.1)'; Elbadawi  (1993), Equations (12) and (13); Kamin (1991), Tables
2 and 3b; Kaminsky  (1991), Table 4; Kaufmann  and O'Coanell (1993), Table ??; Ozler (1992), Appendix.
I  Effects operating  through dollar export prices (+)  and dollar import prices (-)  were estimated  separately and
imply conflicting  conclusions  regarding the terms of trade effect.
2  Results for import tariffs (+)  and quantitative  restrictions  (-) were both insignificantly  different from zero.
3  See Kaminsky  (November 1991). Results reported  here are impulse responses from a structural vector
autoregression  including  the premium. nominal  official  exchange  rate, price level. nominal interest rate. and real
output.  Short run effects refer to a I-year horizon  and long-run  effocts to 3 years.  Contemporaneous  effects on
the premium are constrained  to zero except in the case of the official exchange rate.  Significance  levels are not
reported.
4  Very close to significance  at the 10% level.15
or - the direction of the estimated  impact over each horizon. Asterisks  identify results that are
statistically  significant  at the 10%  level or better.  We now discuss the results in turn.
4.2.1 Money and fiscal deficits
An expansion  of money balances  (measured  in dollars at the official  exchange rate) raises the
premium in the shon run in all cases.  In Sudan, Turkey and Mexico, it raises the premium in the long
run as well. These results imply that money  growth in excess of the rate of official depreciation  will
raise the parallel premium. Given the tight link between  government  deficits and money  growth in
many of these countries,  this suggests  that a major reason for persistently  high premia in some of the
case study countries may be inconsistency  between  the deficit and exchange rate policy.
As discussed  in Lizondo  (1990), the theoretical  literature is nearly unanimous  in predicting  that
an increase in the fiscal deficit, other things equal, leads to an increase in the premium.' 2 Figure 4
uses a larger cross-section  to confirm that countries  that on average have large budget  deficits also
tend to have large premia in the foreign  exchange market." 3 This finding  is corroborated  by time
series/cross  section evidence for a large sample of developing  countries  in Ghei and Kiguel (1992);
Marion (1992) provides similar evidence  of Belgium,  France and Italy.
4.2.2 Interest rates and expected  depreciation
Table 4 also shows that increases in the interest parity differential  increase the premium in the
short run, as predicted  by the theory; in some cases, this effect persists in the long run. Since
variation in this variable is dominated  by changes  in expected  depreciation,  this implies a powerful
role for exchange rate expectations  in determining  the premium.
2  The main exceptions  are models  in which Ricardian  equivalence  holds  and  prices are fully flexible, a set of circumstances
that  is not very relevant  from an empirical  point  of view.
"  The  figure  uses  average  values  of variables  for the  period  1976-89.  The  simple  correlation  between  the two variables  is
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The fundamental  role of asset markets in the determination  of the pamrlel  rate is underscored
in the Argentina  case by separate evidence  suggesting  that domestic interest rates embodies an
unbiascd  prediction  of the rate of devaluation  in the parallel  market, as would be implied by a well-
functioning  asset market under rational  expectations.
4.2.3 Do devaluations  affect the Dremium?
We mentioned  above that the theory suggests  that the premium is unaffected  by an equi-
proportionate  increase in the nominal money stock, the domestic price level, and the nominal exchange
rate.  In all cases but Argentina,  the authors imposed  this homogeneity  restriction  by entering the
nominal exchange rate only indirectly,  through real balances and the real exchange rate. The results in
these cases suggest that an official  devaluation  that is not offset by domestic money  growth and
inflation  will lower the parallel premium,  as predicted  by the theory. In Argentina,  the homogeneity
restrictions  were tested and could not be rejected.
Long-run  homogeneity  is further  supported by the descriptive  analysis  in some of the case
studies.  In general, the evidence  suggests that in the absence  of supporting  macroeconomic  policy
fundamentals,  the effect on the premium  of a devaluation  of the official  rate is negative but very
transitory,  often lasting less than a quarter. Figure 5 makes this point dramatically  for Tanzania;  each
of the three substantial  devaluations  implemented  between 1981  and 1985 reduced  the premium on
impact, but for two of the devaluations  this effect was completely  reversed  in a single quarter, and for
the third it was reversed in two quarters.
Figure 6 provides further  evidence  of the cycle of official  devaluations  and increases  in the
premium countries  can experience  if policy-makers  fail either to address underlying  sources of high
monetary growth or to accommodate  these sources through continuous  exchange rate adjustments.
Figure 6a shows the Venezuelan  premium during the dual exchange rate episode of 1983-89.
Having emerged on implementation  of the dual system, the premium  rose to above 200 percent by late16-A
Figure 5
Tanzania: Official  Exchange Rate and Parallel  Premium
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1983. The devaluation  of early 1984 cut the premium nearly in half.  In the absence  of a change in
urderlying policies, however, the premium resumed  its increase  until a second maxi-devaluation  was
implemented  in late 1986. The devaluation-premium  cycle was finally eliminated  when the foreign
exchange market was unified in 1989.
The Sudan provides an even more dramatic  example  of the devaluation-premium  cycle.  Figure
6b shows the results of four maxi-devaluations  in the 1980s,  each of which brought down the premium
significantly. After each of these episodes,  however, the premium  began to rise again, reaching very
high levels (exceeding  100 percent) before  being brought down again through a new devaluation.
Turkey and Ghana provide  examples of the role of macroeconomic  adjustments  in achieving  a
more sustained  reduction in the premium. In Turkey (Figure 6c), the premium rose dramatically
during the late 1970s  and early 1980s  as a result of problems  in the external sector and acute
macroeconomic  instability. It was brought down definitively  by the devaluation  in 1981, which was
part of a broader  package that included a reduction  in the budget  deficit and adopton of a crawling
peg.  Ghana's premium (Figure 6d) was reduced  permanently  with the devaluation  of 1983, thanks to
a broad-based  macroeconomic  reform program  that combined  fiscal austerity with adoption  of a more
flexible  exchange rate and substantial  new aid inflows.
4.2.4  Flow determinants
On the current account side, a real appreciation  increases  the premium in both the short run
and the long run, as suggested by the theory. Since exchange rate expectations  are already captured in
the interest parity variable,  this result points to the powerful  effect of overvaluation  on aggregate  trade
flows. A real appreciation  reduces  aggregate  exports and (holding  trade policy constant)  increases
imports; for a given premium,  this means a decreased  flow supply of dollars and an increased flow
demand. The premium rises both in the long run, to restore  balance in the parallel current account,
and in the shon run, through  expectations  of higher future premia.  Results for aid and the terms of18
trade, two variables  with theoretically  ambiguous  effects  on the premium, are available for a subset of
the case studies. The estimated  effects are generally  statistically  insignificant. They tend uniformly  to
be negative,  however, suggesting  that these variables  affect the parallel trade balance  mainly through
the net supply of dollars rather than through income effect that raise total spending. The evidence on
tvade  policy is limited to Argentin;, Ghana and Sudan, but in these cases the variables generally  enter
with the right sign, indicating  that a tightening  of restrictions  on imports  or a cut in the export tax rate
increases  the premium. Irterestingly,  adoption  of an own-funds  scheme, which amounts  to a
liberalization  of imports  at the parallel rate, appears  to increase the premium  in the Tanzanian  case, as
predicted  by the theory. 14
4.2.5  Determinants  of the Premium: The Overall  Picture
Taken together, the results in Table 4 suggest that macroeconomic  forces, particularly  those
influencing  the real exchange rate, asset stocks and exchange  rate expectations,  play an important  and
systematic  role in determining  the parallel premium across a wide range of individual  countries.  These
findings are corroborated  by those of Ghei and Kiguel (1992), who estimate a version of the
stock/flow  model using a cross-country  sample  of developing  countries  (a sample that includes, but is
not limited to, the case study countries). Ghei and Kiguel find that the portfolio variables and the real
exchange rate explain a large percentage  (above 70 percent on average) of the variability  in the spread
between the official and the parallel  exchange rates. The results are strongest for countries with
premia exceeding 35 percent, a category including most of the case study countries.' 5 Moreover,  the
cross-sectional  structure of the sample  allows a formal test for differences  in the determination  of the
premium according  to the legality  of the parallel rate; as suggested  by the qualitative  similarities  across
''  In an own-funds scheme, individuals  are granted import licenses without being asked where they obtained their foreign
exchange.  This tends to raise the premium because the  flow demand for foreign exchange increases while the flow supply, in the
absence of strong output effects from the import liberalization,  is unaffected  (unless exports are simultaneously  liberalized).
O'Connell (1992) provides a theoretical  treatment.
Is The results are somewhat weaker for countries with moderate premia (ranging from 10 to 35 percent), and poor for
countries with premia below 10 percent.19
countries  in Table  4, it is impossible  to reject  the hypothesis that the model is identical for countries in
which the parallel rate is official and unofficial.
5. Premium,  the Balance  of Payments  and Inflation
This section evaluates  the impact of the parallel foreign  exchange markets on the balance  of
payments  and inflation.
5.1  Limited Insulation of the Balance of Payments
In theory, dual systems insulate intemational  reserves from capital flows and portfolio shifts
while allowing the authorities  to maintain  full convertibility  for current account  transactions. In
practice, the picture is more complicated  because the size of the premium affects official trade flows
and because  of leakages the authorities  are not able to fully separate capital and current account
transactions. The empirical  evidence from the case studies and elsewhere  indicates  that insulation  is
far from complete, and that it is a declining  function  of the size of the parallel  premium, and the
length of time that the system remains in place. Table 5 summarizes  the findings of the case studies
on trade flows, trade taxes, and capital flight. The major linkage explored in the case studies was
between  the parallel premium and official  exports. In all four countries  for which evidence is
available (Argentina,  Ghana, Sudan, and Zambia),  a rise in the parallel premium reduces  a major
category of official  exports (cocoa and copper, respectively,  in Ghana and Zambia; and aggregate
exports in Argentina,  and Sudan) as a result  of misinvoincing  or smuggling. In Ghana, for example,
as a result of exchange rate overvaluation  and growth in the parallel premium exports in 1985 were
just 11.6 percent of GDP, as compared with 23.9 in 1970.
There is also evidence  that the dual system fails to insulate reserves from capital flows. For
Argentina,  Kamin finds that agents resorted  to overinvoicing  of exports and underinvoicing  of imports20
in order to gain access to foreign  exchange at the official rate.  In addition,  they were able to evade
restrictions  on capital account  transactions  by using special financial  arrangements  available  to
exporters (pre-export  financing). Marion (1992) argues that in the French and Italian episodes agents
used trade credit to move capital in or out of the countries. Finally, Kaminsky  shows that the
adoption  of the dual system in Mexico  failed to stop capital flight. In fact, capital flight was higher
after the adoption of the dual exchange rate system than it was before.' 6
The imposition  of strict foreign  exchange  controls can of course ensure insulation  of
intemational  reserves (through rationing). During certain  episodes in Ghana and Tanzania,  for
example,  reserves dropped nearly to zero, so that although  the exchange rate was nominally  pegged,
the central  bank was -nable to intervene  in support of the domestic currency. In contrast to most legal
dual systems, the exchange  control regime in these cases implied  no commitment  on the part of the
central bank to finance a payments imbalance  on even a subset of current account  transactions.
5.2  Temoorarv  Insulation  of Domestic  Prices
Are parallel foreign exchange  markets effective in insulating  domestic  prices from balance  of
payments  pressures? Much depends on the nature of the balance  of payments  problem. The evidence
from the case studies indicates  that parallel  foreign exchange  markets can at best provide temporary
insulation,  and mainly when the pressures  for devaluation  are generated  by short term capital outflows.
Their scope is much more limited when a devaluation  is needed to deal with balance  of payments
problems  resulting from generalized  excess demand (i.e. from expansionary  domestic policies).
At times of balance  of payments  crisis the exchange rate tends to be extremely  volatile and to
overshoot its long run equilibrium  level. As we saw earlier in the Mexican  case, a dual exchange rate
system can limit the inflationary  impact of the depreciation  by allowing  the financial rate to absorb a
major share of the balance  of payments  pressure. Figures  7a and 7b show the monthly  evolution of
''  One  rmason  for this  paradoxical  outcome  is that the  Mexican  authoribes  intervened  in the  parallel  foreign  exchange  narket
to avoid  a further  depreciatdon  of the parallel  rate.20-A
Figure 7.a
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the official and the parallel real bilateral exchange  rates (vis a vis the US dollar) for Argentina  and
Venezuela. The figures indicate  quite clearly  that the parallel exchange rate depreciated  drastically  at
the ime of the adoption  of the dual system, overshooting  its eventual  long-run equilibrium  level.  In
both cases, the case study author argues that the dual exchange  rate system provided  some short-term
insulation  of domestic  prices by channeling  most current account traisactions to the official foreign
exchange market.
The effectiveness  of parallel systems in insulating  domestic prices is greatest during the first
year, however. In most of the episodes, as can be seen from the figure,  the real parallel  exchange rate
started to appreciate around 3 months after the crisis, and stabilized  after a period of around 9 months.
This indicates  that most of the gains regarding  insulation  occurred  during the first 6 to 9 months in
which the system was in place, and that they became  small after that.
In the longer term, a parallel exchange rate is not an effective way of maintaining  low
inflation. In fact, the evidence  from the case studies (and elsewhere)  shows that in countries that fail
to control monetary growth, the parallel exchange rate depreciates  and domestic inflation  continues
even if the government  keeps a fixed official  exchange rate. Chhibber  and Shafik (1991) and Ansu
(G991)  showed that over long periods the parallel exchange  rate, rather than the official  rate, is the key
determinant  of cost push influences  on domestic inflation  in Ghana. Similarly,  Aaron and Elbadawi
(1992) using annual data find that in Zambia  depreciations  in the parallel exchange rate led to
accelerations  in domestic  inflation. The Mexican  case study also raises doubts about the usefulness  of
the dual system in insulating prices in the longer term. Kaminsky  (1991) compared  the time series
properties  of inflation before and after the adoption  of the dual exchange rate system, and concluded
that the systein provided  litle  (if any) insulation  on domestic prices. Finally, Ghei and Kiguel (1992)
studied  the response  of inflation  to changes  in the parallel exchange rate in a cross-section  of
developing  countries, and found that the parallel  exchange rate played a significant  role in domestic
price determination.22
A central message  is that insulation  can only be effective in the short term; parallel  exchange
rate systems are not a way to repress  inflation. In Venezuela,  for example,  while inflation  did not
increase significantly  during the early phase of the dual system, it finally went up from 10%  in 1982
to around 30% in 1988,  mainly because  the authorities  failed to adopt restrictive  policies to deal with
extemal imbalances. Likewise,  in Argentina,  inflation  rose from 150% in 1982  to over 600% in 1985
as a result of large budget  deficits and protracted  problems  in the balance of payments. In the longer
term, inflation is determined  by domestic  policies and not much can be gained by having a parallel
foreign exchange  market.
6.  Unification
This section  examines successful  and unsuccessful  episodes  of foreign  exchange  market
unification  in the countries  included in our project.  Unification  means different things to different
people, but there are two interpretations  that are important  in practice. The first refers to the adoption
of a single exchange rate for all external  account transactions,  with full convertibility  if the exchange
rate is managed;  this is a movement  out of Table 1, and corresponds  to what we will term "full
unification." The second refers to the adoption  of a single exchange rate for all current account
transactions,  while maintaining  convertibility  restrictions  and therefore  a parallel market for portfolio
and capital account operations. We term this arrangement  "partial  unification";  it corresponds  to a
movement  from the right side to the left side in Table 1.23
6.1  Rapid Unification  at Times of Crisis
The three Latin American  countries in our project, Venezuela,  Mexico, and Argentina,  fully
unified the foreign  exchange market, and paradoxically,  this was done at times of macroeconomic
crisis. This suggests  that multiple systems have not been abandoned  because  they were no longer
necessary  to protect intemational  reserves and preserve  macroeconomic  stability, but because they were
no longer able to do so."'
Venezuela,  after six years of operating a multiple system, unified its foreign  exchange market
in February 1989  by floating the exchange rate. This move was prompted by severe balance  of
payments  problems,  at a time when the premium was close to 200 percent. This large spread
generated  opportunities  for corruption  and rent-seeking  which created a hostile attitude towards  the
system. The unification  of the exchange markets,  which has been maintained  so far, was part of a
comprehensive  stabilization  program  that included  a reduction  in the fiscal deficit, trade liberalization,
and more reliance  on markets;  moreover,  as we emphasize  in the following  section, the unification
itself exerted a substantial  poitive  effect on the government  budget.
Mexico  unified its foreign  exchange  market in December 1987, after more than five years of
operating a dual system, into a fixed  exchange rate which later tumed into a crawling  peg.  Although
formally two markets continued to exist for a number of years, the spread between  the two exchange
rates was minimal. Unification  was undertaken  at a time of macroeconomic  crisis, the stock market
crushed in October 1987, inflation  was on a dangerous accelerating  path (it exceeded 15% in
December),  and the parallel exchange rate was depreciating  rapidly. Unification  was part of package
aimed at stabilizing  prices and restoring  extemal balance.
Argentina  has had mixed success in unifying  the foreign  exchange  market. Two unification
attempts failed; the first one, in December 1981, was later reversed  due to the suspension  of foreign
7  An alternativc  interpretation  is that  crises  present  policy-makers with opportunities  to reform  macroeconomic  policies  at
lower political cost  thian  during  normal  times. In this interpretation,  a dual regime  may have  scrved  its purpose  long ago  but
unification  was  postponed  because  of its political  cost.24
financing and increased  capital flight originating  from the South Atlantic war with Great Britain. The
markets were unified again in April 1982,  but the authorities  quickly reversed  course, and pegged the
exchange rate for commercial  transactions,  with predictable  results:  the re-emergence  of a parallel
market. A more durable unification,  to a floating  exchange rate, was achieved  at the end of 1989. As
in other episodes this was done in the midst of a macroeconomic  crisis, as the economy  was
experiencing  an explosive  hyperinflation. In this instance, the parallel foreign  exchange market was
abandoned  because  it did not serve arn useful purpose.
6.2  Gradual Unification in Highly Distorted Economies
Unification  in Turkey was a gradual process that lasted nearly a decade, with a first phase that
c.oncentrated  on unification  for current account transactions  while keeping the premium small, and a
second one in which the main objective was to achieve  fuU  unification. The process began in 1980
with a maxi-devaluation  and a phasing out of multiple exchange  rates practices. It also included, in
stages, adoption  of more flexible  exchange rate management  so as to maintain a realistic real exchange
rate, liberalization  of imports,  and relaxation  of controls on the capital account. Capital  account
liberalization  was completed  in 1989 when domestic residents  were permitted  to purchase foreign
securities, and since then the black market has essentially  disappeared.
In contrast to the group of Latin American  countries,  the African economies  included in our
project have only pursued partial unification,  and the move in that direction  has been gradual. Ln
Ghana, unification  proceeded  gradually as part of the comprehensive  reform process  began in 1983,
which included  monetary and fiscal restraint, increases  in  producer  prices, relaxation  of import
controls, and a more flexible  management  of the official exchange  rate.  The exchange  rate system,
which initially consisted  of an official market with a rigidly fixed exchange rate and a thriving  black
market, has been transformed  after several modifications  into one comprising  two legal markets with
floating rates and a negligible  spread between  them, and a reduced illegal market. The black market25
premium  declined from above 2000% at the beginnings  of 1983 to 24% in April 1988,  when the
second legal market became  operational  and practically  absorbed the black market. The spread
between the two legal markets declined  gradually  and has remained  around 5% since April 1990.
Tanzania, in comparison,  was well on the way to partial unification  by the early 1990s. The
premium declined from over 700 percent in 1986 to roughly 50 percent in 1990. Unification,  as in
most cases, was part of a more comprehensive  program that has gradually succeeded  in liberalizing
markets and restoring  macroeconomic  stability. Partial unification  has taken place in three steps. In
1984, the authorities  devalued and introduced  an "own-funds"  scheme that allowed holders of (illegal)
foreign  exchange to obtain import licenses freely; by 1986 the own-funds  window  was financing  a
third of the total imports bill, with the remainder  of imports  (and the bulk of exports) going through
the official rate.  In 1986, the authorities  devalued again and adopted a crawling  peg and a major
macroeconomic  reform package,  heavily supported by extemal assistance. More recently,  the
authorities  have introduced  private foreign  exchange bureaus and opened the bulk of export and import
trade to these bureaus.
A common  element in the above  episodes is the ability  to sustain unification. In this respect,
the most recent unifications  in Argentina,  Mexico,  Turkey and Venezuela  were successful. Likewise,
Ghana, and Tanzania have gradually but steadily moved  towards reducing  the premium, and have
remained  in a path which appears  to lead to l'ull unification. What explains the success in these
episodes? Before answering  this question it is useful to examine the causes of some of the reversals.
6.3  Understanding Reversals
Among the Latin American  countries, Argentina  attempted and failed to unify the foreign
exchange market twice in the early eighties. In both cases the zttempts  failed because the authorities
maintained  expansionary  demand management  policies (namely large budget deficits financed  by
money  creabon) while at the same time they tried to use the official exchange rate as an anchor for26
infladon. As the expansionary  policies  sustained  high inflation, the official exchange rate became
overvalued  and the authorities  were forced  to introduce  foreign  exchange controls in order to the
defend the parity. As a result, a parallel foreign  exchange market re-emerged  and the unification
attempt failed.
Sudan and Zambia provide  examples  of partial unification  attempts  that were reversed. Sudan
tried to unify its foreign exchange  market as part of a series of liberalization  and stabilization  program
started in 1979. In this process,  the exchange  system underwent  numerous modifications  while a
growing number  of transactions  were shifted from the official  market to a legalized  parallel  market in
an effort to reduce the coverage of the black market. However,  lax domestic policies led to the
reappearance  of a large black market premium and the expansion  of black market transactions.
Zambia  experienced  two failed attempts  at unification. The first episode  (1983-85) was an attempt at
reducing the black market premium based on a crawling  peg system for the official exchange rate.
This effort, however, was unsuccessful  primarily  due to large adverse  changes in the terms of trade
that led to increases in the premium and abandonment  of the crawling peg system. The second
episode (1985-87)  was an attempt at reducing the volume of transactions  in the black market using an
auction system in the official market. This attempt also failed as lax monetary and fiscal policies led
to increases  in the premium and the expansion  of black market activities.
6.4  Successful Unification Requires Realistic Policies
The choice of exchange rate system adopted at the time of unification  does not appear to be a
critical determinant  of success. Some countries (Ghana,  Turkey) unified to a crawling  peg, others to a
fixed exchange  rate (Mexico,  and Venezuela  in the 60s) and a third group to a floating  exchange rate
(Argentina  and Venezuela). The key element for successful  unification  has been the acceptance  of the
need for consistency  between  the unified exchange rate and monetary and fiscal policy. In practice,27
this has meant that exchange rate policy had to accommodate  the underlying  inflationary  pressures
generated by the fiscal deficit.
In countries  that attempt to bring inflation  down and improve  the external balance  at the time
of unification,  the process needs to be accompanied  by fiscal and credit policies that are supportive  of
this objective. This was the approach  followed  in Mexico,  Ghana, Turkey and Venezuela,  where the
unification  efforts were supported  by cuts in the budget deficit and a tightening  in domesdc  credit.
While inflation  did not always fall after unification,  the authorities  accommodated  the inflation
sufficiently  to avoid severe overvaluation,  and the overall macroeconomic  situation usually  improved,
minimizing  the prospects for a reversal.
In other cases unification  was possible while the economies  maintained  important
macroeconomic  imbalances. In Argentina,  for example, the foreign exchange market was unified in
December 1989 when the govemment  was still running large budget deficits and needed to resort to
the inflation  tax.  While unification  was possible, it required  the acceptance  of a rapidly depreciating
exchange rate in order to avoid a real appreciation  while inflation  continued. While the Argentine
hyperinfladon  is an extreme  example,  in the other successful  episodes the authorities  adopted an
exchange rate policy which, to different degrees,  accommodated  domestic  inflation.
Regarding  speed, the Latin American  episodes suggest that a quick unification  is desirable at
times of macro-crisis  (especially  when inflation  is getting out of control). However,  these economies
were by and large less distorted than the others included in the project and their capital markets are
better integrated  to the world financial  markets. The maintenance  of a parallel foreign  exchange
market (and a relatively large spread) was difficult to sustain because agents could easily find ways to
beat the system.
In economies that start from a situation with extensive  price controls, barriers  to trade, and thin
financial  markets a gradual approach  could well be appropriate. In Turkey, and Ghana (and to some
extent in Tanzania) unification  in the foreign exchange  market has moved pari passu with the28
implementation  of structural reforms aimed at enlarging  the role of market mechanisms  in determining
resource  allocation,  an approach that was by and large successful.
Last, but not least, success largely depends  on the authorities' commitment  to the unification
effort. This is crucial because  unification  may have some short-term  adverse  consequences  such as a
temporary  increase in inflation  or an undesired  drop in real wages. To the extent that the authorities
are determined  to proceed with unification  despite these short-term  difficulties,  the policy can be
sustained. Inflation increased  upon unification  in Venezuela.  but the authorities  did not revert their
policies because they were convinced that a sustained  reducdon in inflation would be obtained  by
prudent monetary and fiscal policies rather than by the splitting of the foreign  exchange market. In
contrast, in the unification  efforts in Zambia  were not sustained  because the government  was unwilling
to accept the large and possible continued  depreciation  required to maintain equilibrium  in the official
market.
7. Some Pleasant (Quasi-?)Fiscal Arithmetic
Although the fiscal consequences  of parallel exchange  rates are emphasized  in theoretical
work, little is known at the empirical  level.  In this section, we provide  estimates for some countries  in
our project. We acknowledge  in advance  that these estimates  are rough and partial, as problems  in
measuring  public sector deficits are well known,  and we needed to make some heroic assumptions
regarding  the shadow  equilibrium  exchange  rate.  Pinto (1989) has cautioned  that unification
constitutes  a fiscal shock that may require an increase in inflation;  our results suggest  that the outcome
in practice is often more pleasant (and the implications  of parallel rates correspondingly  more
unpleasant).
Equation (I) summarizes  the fiscal impact of parallel exchange  rates
(1)  (D - D) + I(E' - E)(x - m)]29
A '*' over a variable indicates  the level it would take in a hypothetical  unified system. Thus, E  is the
exchange rate that would be consistent  with equilibrium  in the balance  of payments  in a unified
system. D denotes  the non-financial  public sector  deficit; x and m denote central bank purchases  and
sales of foreign exchange from the private sector.
The first term in brackets in equation  (1) shows the effect of the multiple system on the non-
financial  public sector's budget. The second term shows the implicit  gains or losses incurred by the
central bank in its foreign exchange  transactions  with the private sector under the multiple system.
Table 6 presents the evidence  from five countries  in our project, with the information
classified in terms of the two components  of (1)."'  While it was possible to obtain specific estimates
for the effect on central bank profits, the effect on the domestic  currency budget could be assessed
only in qualitative  terms, with the exception  of the case of Tanzania.
Table 6 shows that the fiscal effect of parallel rates is not uniform across  countries. There are
countries with central banks profits and others with central bank losses; some in which the domestic
currency budget  improves  and others in which it worsens. Furthermore,  the two components  of (1) do
not necessarily  work in the same direction.
The qualitative  effect on central bank profits depends primarily  on whether  the central bank is
a net buyer or a net seller of foreign  exchange to the private sector."  This is paricularly the case
when the central bank's buying and selling exchange rates for its transactions  with the private sector
are equal.  Since this exchange rate is usually appreciated  with respect to the shadow exchange  rate
(equal to the parallel exchange  rate in all the estimations  in table 6), net sales to the private sector
generate losses while net purchases  generate  profits. In Zambia,  for examnple,  the central bank was a
''  Far Venezuela and Zanbia  the estinates of the effects on central bank accounts reflect our calculations based on data
provided by the authors.
19  Since all foreign exchange transactions of the public sector are usually conducted through the central bank. "central bank" net
foreign exchange transactions with the private sector are equivalent to "overall public sector" net foreign exchange transuctions with
the private sector.29-A
Table  6
FISCAL  EFFECTS  OF MULTIPLE  EXCHANGE  RATES




Tanzania  +-  + - + -
Venezuela
Zambia  +
DOMESTIC  CURRENCY  BUDGET
Effect  Channel  Method
Argentina  - Export  underinvoicing  Regression  of official
reduces  export  tax  revenue  exports  on premium
Sudan  - Reduces  revenue  from  trade  Regressions  of  trade
taxes  taxes  revenue  on
premium
Tanzania  +  - Reduces  revenue  from  tax  on  Assumption
imports  (customs  and  sales);
reduces  export  producers  prices
Zambia  +  Increases  revenue  from  tax  Correlation
on imports  (customs  and  sales)  coefficient  between
revenue  and premium
CENTRAL  BANK  PROFITS  FROM  FOREIGN  EXCHANGE  TRANSACTIONS  WITH  PRIVATE  SECTOR
Periodicity  No.  Years  Maximum  Minimum  AveracTe
As percentage  of GDP
Argentina  Yearly  7  3.5  1.3  2.1
Tanzania  Yearly  14  0.4  -9.8  -4.5
Venezuela  Yearly  4  -14.7  -25.4  -20.5
Zambia  Monthly  2  -12.2  -16.2  -14.230
net seller to the private sector and thus it suffered losses.20  The same applies to Tanzania, where the
central bank was a net seller to the private sector in all the years but one.  In Venezuela,  the buying
and selling rates were different, but the central bt*nk  was a net seller by such large amounts  that this
factor dominated  and the central bank suffered losses. In Argentina,  the central bank was a net buyer
of foreign  exchange from the private sector and thus benefitted  from the dual exchange rate system.
The magnitude  of the effect on central bank accounts  may be quite significant. Estimations
range from a positive 3.5 percent of GDP for Argentina  to a negative  of 25.4 percent of GDP for
Venezuela. 2'  The absolute  size of these estimates  is almost surely biased upwards  since the parallel
exchange rate most likely overestimates  the true value of foreign  exchange,  but the estimated  effects
remain significant  even after correcting  for a possible bias.  For example,  using a shadow exchange
rate equal to 60% of the paallel exchange rate in the case of Venezuela  reduces  the estimated  average
effect on central bank profits from 20.5% of GDP to 4.7% of GDP.
The effect of the multiple system on the domestic  currency budget (D) was estimated  only for
Tanzania. The authors assume that some components  of the domestic currency  budget (custom  duties,
sales taxes on imports,  and producer  prices for exports paid to farmers  by parastatals)  are filly indexed
to the exchange rate, while other components  (other tax revenue  and public sector wages)  are not
indexed at all.  Under these assumptions,  multiple  rates have both positive and negative  effects on the
domestic currency  budget. On the one hand, a large spread allows the government  to keep producer
prices low, thereby reducing  expenditure. On the other hand, a large spread reduces  declared imports,
thereby reducing revenue  from import taxes. For the period 1976-89,  it is estimated  that the multiple
system in Tanzania generated  a net positive average annual effect equivalent  to 2.1% of GDP.
2 "The esimations  shown  here  for Venezuela  and  Zambia  differ from those  presented  by the  respective  authors  in their
individual  case  studies.  Although  the  Venezuelan  oil company  (PDVSA)  is pubhcly  owned  and the  Zambian  copper  company
(ZCCMC)  is largely  pubhcly  owned,  the  estimation  of the  fiscal  effect  on central  bank  accounts  in the  individual  case  studies  tbeat
these  companies  as  pan of the  private  sector.  The  estimadons  presented  here  include  those  companies  as  part of the  public  sector.
2 Due  to lack of detailed  information.  in the  esdmadon  for Argentina  central  bank  foreign  exchange  sales  to and  pturchases  from
the  private  sector  include  only those  arising  from merchandise  trade  transactions,  and the  central  bank  buying  exchange  rate
includes  export  taxes  and subsidies.31
Although  other case studies do not present estimates  of the effect on the domestic curmncy
budget that fit directly into the framework  above, they offer some evidence  about the influence  of the
exchange rate premium on revenue from trade taxes, which is one of the components  of the domestic
currency budget. Thne  evidence, however,  is mixed. While an increase  in the premium seems to
reduce revenue  from trade taxes in Argentina  and Sudan, the opposite appears  to be the case in
Zambia.
Casual evidence  suggests  that Ghana and Mexico  incurred fiscal losses from having parallel
exchange rate systems. In Ghana, most tax revenues  in the early 1970s were related  to trade. As
official imports  and exports (especially  cocoa) collapsed as a result of the large premium in the
parallel market, trade taxes fell from around 8% of GDP in the early 1970s  to just 1% in 1982. In the
case of Mexico,  the public sector is a net "producer"  of foreign  exchange,  as revenues  from oil exports
far exceed the cost of servicing  the public external  debt.  For example,  oil exports generated  around
US$16 billion in 1983  and 1984, while net official  extemal transfers were respectively  US$4.2 billion
and US$6.2 billion. On average, the public sector generated  US$10 billion in those years, and in all
likelihood  was a net seller of foreign  exchange to the private sector.
Overall,  in the countries that we examined  the existence  of parallel foreign exchange  markets
generated fiscal losses. Most of them do not appear directly in the budgetary  accounts, which are
affected  only indirectly. Instead,  they were primarily  generated  by net sales to the private at below
equilibrium  exchange rates. In most of the countries in our sample the consolidated  public sector was
a net "producer"  of foreign  exchange,  either because public sector enterprises  are the main exporters  in
the economy  (as in Mexico, Venezuela  and Zambia),  or because the consolidated  public sector
received  large extemal transfers.32
8.  Final Thoughts
In this section we will elaborate  on the policy implications  of having  or adopting  parallel
foreign exchange  markets in developing  countries. The studies done for this project indicate that, on
the whole, the experiences  were disappointing. Most countries tolerated  high premia for long periods,
with damaging effects on the allocation  of resources and growth. The studies do not indicate  any clear
gains from keeping the system in place. In what follows we will briefly examine  some controversial
arguments  regarding the use of parallel foreign  exchange markets, and provide some insights from our
study on each of them.
8.1 In Practice the System is Misused
The case for a parallel (dual) foreign  exchange  system is stronger when adopted as a
temporary  option to deal with severe  balance of payments  crises (e.g. Dombusch (1986)). Argentina,
Mexico,  and Venezuela  at the time of the debt crisis in fact resorted  to the dual system as a way to
smooth out the increase in the exchange rate to achieve the required real depreciation. The
depreciation  in the parallel exchange rate provided  a safety valve to absorb the pressure  coming from
capital outflows, while the official exchange rate continued  to serve as a nominal anchor  to prices.
These arrangements  helped the governments  for a while in maintaining  limited control over domestic
inflation,  and avoiding  a sharp drop in real wages while protecting  the balance  of payments. In the
longer tern not much was gained by maintaining  the system.
In practice,  the effectiveness  of a dual exchange rate system is inversely related  to the size of
the premium and the length of time that it remains in place.
The episodes reviewed in this paper suggest  that the dual system was misused more often than
not, both in terms of over-extending  the duration of the system, and in maintaining  a larger premium
than it would be desirable. Venezuela,  for example,  maintained  the dual system for six years, Mexico
for five, and Argentina  for eight years (counting  official and quasi-official  parallel exchange rates).33
The average premium during this period was 44% in Argentipa,  30% in Mexico and 120% in
Venezuela.  In two of these countries,  Argentina  and Venezuela,  there were no clear efforts during this
"temporary"  period to correct monetary  and fiscal policies to restore  extemal balance. Thus, it is
doubtful  that in these cases the macroeconomic  gains (in terms of keeping  equilibrium  in the balance
of payments,  and lower inflation)  were larger than the costs it has in terms of misallocadon  of
resources. These experiences  weaken  the case for recommending  the adoption of dual exchange rates,
even in circumstances  when in "theory"  it could be appealing.
In other cases parallel foreign  exchange markets were used as a long tern arrangement  to
maintain overvalued  real exchange rates and expansionary  macroeconomic  policies in place for
prolonged  periods. In Ghana and Tanzania,  for instance, the authorities  had to rely on extensive
foreign  exchange controls to avoid a full depletion  of reserves. The large premia in these economies
(in excess of 1,000%  at some times) is clear evidence  of a dramatic  inconsistency  between  exchange
rate policy on the one hand, and monetary  and fiscal policies on the other.
While there are numerous  examples  of macroeconomic  mismanagement  associated  with the co-
existence  of parallel foreign  exchange  markets, there are also cases in which the system was used
judiciously. Belgium had a dual exchange rate system for more than three decades and the system did
not lead to major distortions. Likewise,  it is well known  that Colombia  has maintained  an unofficial
parallel foreign  exchange  market for a long time, while preserving  overall macroeconomic  balance. In
these cases, however, the premium was kept low on average (around 2% in Belgium and 6% in
Colombia);  larger premia were only tolerated on a short term basis as a safety valve to deal with
crises. The dual exchange rate system was effective  in these two countries  because they followed
sound macroeconomic  policies.34
8.2 Ex.lainine the Premium,:  Macroeconomic  Factors Matter Most
Regarding  the determinants  of the parallel  exchange rate, the evidence  presented in this paper
indicates  that macroeconomic  fundamentals  matter  most.  In particular,  the premium reflects
inconsistencies  between policies affecting  domestic  absorption  (namely monetary  and fiscal policies)
on the one hand, and the official exchange  rate on the other. In addition, in the short run, the
premium is largely affected  by expectations  of the official exchange  rate.  The studies reviewed  in this
project also indicate that the distinction  between  official and unofficial  pamllel foreign  exchange
markets is not relevant regarding  the determinants  of the parallel exchange rate.
8.3  Unification:  Make Sure it Sticks
A successful  unification  is one that can be sustained  without leading to significant  increases in
inflation  or recurrent balance  of payments  problems. Sustainable  unification  requires the adopton of a
suitable exchange rate system.  In countries where fiscal deficits persist and infladon is bound to
continue, this means the adoption  of a crawling  peg or a managed float. Unifying  to a fixed exchange
rate in these cases will fail as balance  of payments  crisis will loom in the near future. In general, it is
more difficult to unify to a fixed  exchange rate, because it needs a credible  commitment  to maintain
extemal balance even in the event of extemal shocks. In this case the prerequisites  are a strong fiscal
balance  and sufficient reserves  (or quick access to extemal credit) to withstand  extemal shocks or
speculation  against the currency. Unification  to a fixed  exchange rate without  these pre-conditions  sets
up the stage for a reversal.
How important  is unification? There is strong evidence from recent studies on long term
growth that large premiurns  are harmful,2  as they create numerous  microeconomic  distortions,  and
induce corruption.  It is thus important  to unify quickly, especiallv  the foreign  exchange  market for
current account transactions  and ensure convertibility. Automatic  access to foreign  exchange for trade
I  See  World  Bank  (1990),  Easterly  and Levine  (1993).35
creates large efficiency  gains and increases  transparency. Maintaining  a parallel  exchange rate for
capital account and portfolio transactions  is not a top priority,  as long as the premium  remains low
(below 10%). Eventually,  though, given the leakages between  markets full unification  makes sense.
Regarding  speed our project shows  two distinct successful  pattems.  In countries  where the
parallel foreign  exchange market was introduced  to deal with capital flight (e.g. Argendna,  Mexico and
Venezuela),  unification  proceeded  rapidly, generally  as part of a comprehensive  stabilization-
liberalization  package. Unification  meant convertibility  for current and capital account transactions.
In contrast, unification  in Ghana, Tanzania,  and Turkey proceeded  gradually regarding  the
reduction in the premium and/or the number of transactions  that were channeled  to the parallel foreign
exchange market. These countries had more extensive controls  in the economy  and reduction  in
foreign  exchange controls moved  in tandem with liberalization  in other areas. Experience  indicates
that legalization  of the parallel foreign  exchange market is a good first step towards full unification.
Last, but not least, there is puzzle regarding  the motivation  for the use of parallel foreign
exchange markets in the countries  that we studied. In most cases the use of the system resulted in
large premia and in important fiscal losses. It also clear that these large premia also had detrimental
effects on export performance  and growth, while it did not provide much insulation from extemal
shocks. It seems that a "rational"  government  would have pushed for unification. The fact that
unification  has usually taken long, and not always succeeded  indicates  that the motivation  for the use
and maintenance  of the system lies beyond  economics. Political  economy (fears of devaluation)  and
rent seeking probably  played an important  role in this respect.36
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Appendix
The Stock/Flow  Model  of Parallel  Exchange  Rates
Individuals  demand domestic (M) and foreign  (F) assets in a proportion  determined  by the
difference  between their respective  expected  yields. Letting  i', and i, be the foreign  and domestic
interest rates, and noting that the parallel  exchange rate is the price at which portfolio transaction  take
place, this difference  is simply the uncovered  interest paritY  differential  d, a i,  + 8r(lnU,+,)  - InU, - i,
where 8' denotes  an expectation  conditional  on information  available at time t.  Portfolio  equilibrium
can therefore be written
(1)  M, = m(d,,x')U  .F 1,  m' < 0,
where m is the desired ratio of domestic to foreign  assets. Additional  determinants  of portfolio
preferences  are captured in the vector of "portfolio"  determinants  xP,.
Defining  (one plus) the parallel premium by Z a U/E, where E is the official rate, and noting
that the interest parity differential  can be written  d, = d°,  + r,+1  - Z,, where d 0t is the interest parity
differential  at the official exchange rate, equation (1) can be rewritten  as a dynamic equation  for the
parallel premium:
(2)  Zt = Z[8't,,(MX),F,,d°Vx',
+  +  -+
We assume that net capital flows at the commercial  rate are zero, and that the authorities  do not
intervene  at the parallel rate.  Then letting e, be the official real exchange rate (with an increase
denoting a real appreciation)  and x', be a vector  of other variables  that affect the unofficial  current
account (e.g., the terms of trade, trade taxes, and the enforcement  effort), we have the following
expression  for the evolution  of private net foreign assets over time:
(3)  F, 1 , - F, = i1F, + h(Z,e,,xf),39
where h is the parallel trade balance.
Since private stocks of foreign exchange  are typically not observable, neither the portfolio
equilibriwn condition nor the parallel balance of payments condition can be estimated directly.  The
case study authors generally handled this problem by using the portfolio equilibrium condition to
eliminate the stock of foreign exchange from the balance of payments equation.  Under rational
expectations, this yields an equadon for the paraLlel  premium as a function of its own lagged value and
expected future values of the other variables  entering equations (2) and (3) -- including variables like
the ral  money stock and the real official exchange rate that are potentially endogenous. Equation (4)
gives a distributed-lag  approximation to the (partly forward-looking)  solution to (2) and (3):
(4)  Inz, = alnz,., + P(B)'W, + e,
where W,  1 [e,,(ME),d°,,x',,xj'  is a vector of the theoretical determinants  of Z (which enter both
directly and as predictors of their own future values), P(L) is a vector of polynomials in the lag
operator B, and £ is a white-noise disturbance. 23
"  An almniaive  way of arriving at a version of (4)  (cf. Elbadawi  (1991) and Aron and Elbadawi (1991)) is  to compfte  the
study-state soludon  to (2) and (3). assume that the pamllel current account is  balanced so that f is a constant, and use
cointegration/rror-coffection  rethods to esdimate a dynamic specificadon around  the stady  ste.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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